La fi lo so fía del de re cho es una re fle xión ge ne ral y sis te má ti ca so bre las cues tio nes fun da men ta les del de re cho. El he cho de que tér mi nos como "fi lo so fía del de re cho", "teo ría del de re cho" y "ju ris pru den cia" no ten gan sig ni fi ca dos de li mi ta dos e in dis pu ta bles, a pe sar de los es fuer zos de los ju ris tas con tem po rá neos, es una de las ra zo nes que jun to con las transfor ma cio nes del de re cho en vir tud de la glo ba li za ción y las teo rías so bre de re chos hu ma nos han dado lu gar a di ver sas dispu tas so bre la fun ción y va li dez de la fi lo so fía del de re cho. En este ar tícu lo se pre ten de es ta ble cer una base co mún para la dis cu sión en tor no a es tos pro ble mas me dian te la re vi sión de al gu nas de las di fe ren cias que las dos prin ci pa les tra di ciones oc ci den ta les para des pués des cri bir la pre cep ción ge ne ral y evo lución de la fi lo so fía del de re cho.
Con tem po rary dis cus sion on le gal phi los o phy has dealt mainly with the fol low ing top ics: the de lim i ta tion of le gal the ory within this dis ci pline, the dif fer ence be tween le gal dog matic and le gal sci ence, and the dis tinc tion that arises within le gal the ory as a con se quence of the choice be tween an an a lyt i cal method and a syn thetic one. An other topic dis cussed lately is whether the in flu ence of glob al iza tion in gen eral ju ris pru dence could re flect the need of a less pa rochial ju ris pru dence, es pe cially in view of the pre tense that it be con sid ered uni ver sal and not only in the sense of general ab strac tion. The de bate is never-end ing and the fact that the terms 'le gal phi los o phy', 'le gal the ory' and 'ju rispru dence' do not have established undisputed meanings contributes to this dispute. In the last de cades, much crit i cism sur round ing the philo soph i cal method of con cep tual anal y sis in le gal the ory has at tempted to un der mine it. I do not in tend to de vote this pa per to re spond ing to the ob jec tions made (which have al ready been largely dis cussed), but rather to re visit cer tain as pects of an a lyt i cal ju ris pru dence that could explain why some schol ars em brace it and oth ers re ject it. 1 To do this ad e quately and hon or ing the meth ods of an a lyt i cal ju ris pru dence, I would like to ad dress this is sue by mak ing some clar i fi ca tions as to what is un der stood as ju ris prudence in the Con ti nen tal and the Brit ish tra di tions.
I. LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
What is law is the ques tion to be dealt with, but the dispute does not re side in the ob ject of the dis ci pline. Prob -lems arise re gard ing the meth od ol ogy, the scope of the anal y sis and even in the pos si bil ity of know ing and ex plaining law. Dis cuss ing such is sues makes one won der if le gal phi los o phy is an im por tant ac tiv ity. Whether this is a rel evant ques tion or not seems to be part of the prob lem and the an swer to these questions is re lated to the ques tion of the im por tance of phi los o phy, a mat ter that will not be dealt with in this pa per. 2 Philo soph i cal re flec tion on law is as old as law it self, but the term "le gal phi los o phy" is used only af ter Hegel publishes the Prin ci ples of Le gal Phi los o phy (1821). Lato sensu, it re fers to a sys tem atic re flec tion on the mean ing of law, its re la tion to jus tice, the sci ence of law, the struc ture of the le gal sys tem or le gal rea son ing. The ex pres sion 'gen eral theory of law' only ap pears in the late 19 th cen tury as a con sequence of the in flu ence of em pir i cism and pos i tiv ism, and as a re ac tion to le gal phi los o phy to dis card the meta phys ical con sid er ations that af fected the sci en tific na ture of the study on law. 3 Le gal phi los o phy is a branch of phi los o phy, not stem ming from le gal sci ence and dif fer ent from le gal dog matic; 4 it is a spe cial kind of gen eral phi los o phy be cause it an swers funda men tal le gal ques tions and prob lems that are re flected upon and dis cussed philo soph i cally. 5 Phi los o phy is a gen -
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CARLA HUERTA 2 For Pieper, phi los o phy is mean ing ful and nec es sary; phi los o phy is some thing all hu man be ings do; it is the road to knowl edge, to a better under stand ing. In this work, he de fends his un der stand ing of phi los o phy and the philo soph i cal im pulse against com mon ob jec tions and de for mations. Pieper 4 It is called dog matic with re gard of the Kantian method of pure reason be cause ju rists work with pre sup po si tions that they ac cept un proven as true. 5 Kaufmann, "Problemgeschichte der Rechtsphilosophie", in Kaufmann, Hassemer, Neumann (eds.), Einführung in Rechtsphilosophie und Rechtstheorie der Gegenwart, 7th ed., Hei del berg, C. eral and sys tem atic re flec tion about fun da men tal questions. It is a con cep tual ac tiv ity that has a crit i cal di mension, nor ma tive in the sense that it dis tin guishes what is right, best or cor rect; an an a lytic di men sion to iden tify and make ex plicit fun da men tal struc tures, con cepts and prin ciples; and a syn thetic di men sion that at tempts to unite it all into a co her ent whole. 6 Ac cord ing to Bertrand Rus sell, "phi los o phy, like all other stud ies, aims pri mar ily at knowl edge. The knowl edge it aims at is the kind of knowl edge which gives unity and system to the body of the sci ences, and the kind which re sults from a crit i cal ex am i na tion of the grounds of our con victions, prej u dices and be liefs". 7 Con sid er ing the func tion of le gal phi los o phy, Pound writes that "phi los o phies of law have been at tempts to give a ra tio nal ac count of the law of the time and place, or at tempts to for mu late a gen eral theory of the le gal or der to meet the needs of some given pe riod of le gal de vel op ment, or at tempts to state the re sults of the two for mer at tempts uni ver sally and to make them all-suf ficient for law ev ery where and for all time". 8 Le gal phi los o phy, as part of phi los o phy, is there fore a gen eral and sys tem atic re flec tion about fun da men tal questions re gard ing law; its rea son ing about law and phi los o phy is the method to de scribe so cial phe nom ena. It pro duces a de scrip tion of law that is char ac ter ized by be ing highly abstract and gen er al ized. Ac count ing for the na ture of law has there fore mul ti ple di men sions: a nor ma tive one, an an a lytic one and a ho lis tic one. The sys tem atic and crit i cal na ture of le gal phi los o phy re quires a ra tio nal sys tem for its anal y sis that com prises the pre-un der stand ing of law and phi los o - phy, but ac cord ing to Alexy, the best op tion is not an abstract the ory of le gal phi los o phy, but the sys tem atic anal ysis of the ar gu ments put forth in the dis cus sion on the na ture of law. 9 Le gal phi los o phy deals with three main prob lems: what law is, which ad dresses the on to log i cal ques tion which consid ers con cepts of norms and the le gal sys tem; prob lems of va lid ity (au thor i ta tive is su ance) and ef fi cacy (so cial di mension); and le git i macy con cern ing the re la tion ship be tween law and mo ral ity (the ideal or crit i cal di men sion of law). These prob lems can be an a lyzed on the ba sis of three questions: an on to log i cal one (what law is), an eth i cal one (what ought to be done) and an epistemological ques tion (what we can know). Mean while, all the an swers should be con nected by a co her ent the ory that ex plains law. 10 Ques tions about the na ture of law are ques tions about its nec es sary prop er ties (such as co er cion or sanc tion) and the con cept of ne ces sity is at the heart of phi los o phy. The idea of nec es sary fea tures is cen tral to the ex pla na tion of law as a con cept and does not make the de scrip tion of the rel e vant prop er ties of a par tic u lar le gal sys tem ac cord ing to the method of an a lyt i cal ju ris pru dence im pos si ble or fu tile. The pur suit of knowl edge of nec es sary fea tures of law does not rule out any kind of em pir i cal in ves ti ga tion since the philosoph i cal method does not ex clude em pir i cal knowl edge; 11 le gal the ory in fact anal y ses norm sen tences, which are facts given by the leg is la tor. And ac cord ing to Guibourg, in le gal the ory, for ex am ple, an a lyt i cal ju ris pru dence re quires that the moral value of law be proven to pro vide em pir i cal data of the con sti tu tive mean ing of a le gal con cept while con sid er ing the log i cal struc ture of the le gal dis course and to strive for a co her ent the o ret i cal model that ex plains so -112 CARLA HUERTA 9 Alexy, op. cit., note 6, p. 66. 10 Ibi dem, p. 67. 11 Kaufmann ex plains that le gal phi los o phy is di rected at ex pe ri ence and ex per i ment. The ex per i ment is its pres ence in his tory while opin ions on his tor i cal prob lems are posed in a real dis course, op. cit., note 5, p. 27. cial phe nom ena while ground ing com pre hen si ble ar guments. 12 The pur pose of le gal phi los o phy is to ex plain what law is, to aid in its un der stand ing. As Alexy has clearly stated, legal phi los o phy, un der stood as rea son ing on the na ture of law, is in tended to an swer the fun da men tal ques tions about law. In this sense, it also in cludes the prob lems of phi los o phy in gen eral be sides the spe cial prob lems concern ing the spe cific char ac ter of law. In its anal y sis, it is rel e vant to con sider the spe cial re la tion be tween le gal philos o phy and other prov inces of prac ti cal phi los o phy; i.e. moral and po lit i cal phi los o phy, and in Alexy's opin ion, this should not be a mat ter of choice be cause le gal phi los o phy com pre hends all of these per spec tives. 13 Kaufmann be lieves the task of all le gal phi los o phy is to dis tin guish -di rectly or in di rectly-what is le gal from what is just (Recht vom Unrecht zu unterscheiden); in other words, to an swer the ques tion on jus tice as cri te ria to mea sure pos i tive law and in that sense an swer the ques tion on the va lid ity of law. To treat them as sep a rate ques tions has led to con sider le gal phi los o phy on one hand and meth od ol ogy of law on the other. 14 Troper says that as a dis ci pline, it com prises a le gal on tol ogy that searches for the es sence of law and of some con cepts, a le gal epis te mol ogy con ceived as the ex am i na tion of the pos si bil i ties to achieve the knowledge of es sences, a le gal te le ol ogy that tries to de ter mine the ob jec tive of law and a le gal logic that pur sues the anal ysis of le gal ar gu men ta tion. 15 Le some le gal phi los o phers have a pre-the o ret i cal un der standing does not im ply the im pos si bil ity of a gen eral ju ris prudence. On the con trary, this pre-un der stand ing is a hermeneutical ad van tage. Dif fer ent con cep tions on what law is are partly a con sequence of em brac ing one of the two most im por tant tra ditions in West ern le gal phi los o phy: le gal pos i tiv ism and natu ral law. Nev er the less, Alexy sug gests that the choice be tween the com pre hen sive ideal and the re stric tive maxim de ter mines the char ac ter of le gal phi los o phy qua phi los o phy more that the choice be tween pos i tiv ism and non-pos i tivism, since this later de ci sion is made within the realm of legal phi los o phy. 16 An a lyt i cal phi los o phy, for in stance, is more a ques tion of method than of be ing posi tiv ist or not, an epistemic at ti tude that re lies on lin guis tic anal y sis, the fa cil i ta tion of the de vel op ment of em pir i cal sci ences and the re jec tion of meta phys i cal con cep tions. 17 Le gal pos i tiv ism es tab lishes a spe cific con nec tion between law and facts; the 'facticity the sis' claims the in sep ara bil ity of law and fact. The reductive the sis is an as pect of the em pir i cal-reductive le gal pos i tiv ism as op posed to the 'normativity the sis' that claims that law is ex plained in depend ently of fact. Nat u ral law, on the other hand, fo cuses on the (nec es sary) con nec tion be tween law and mo ral ity, or the mo ral ity the sis, its an tith e sis be ing the 'sep a ra bil ity the sis' rep re sented by Hart's work. 18 Le gal phi los o phy is gen er ally un der stood as a spec u la tive and nor ma tive en ter prise closely re lated to moral and po lit ical phi los o phy, but 20 th cen tury ju rists pro duced a profound trans for ma tion of ju ris pru dence. Es pe cially af ter Hans Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart, le gal phi los o phers con sider the pri mary task of ju ris pru dence is de scrip tive, that is 114 "mor ally neu tral and has no jus ti fi ca tory aims". 19 Tra di tion in le gal phi los o phy con sists of the var i ous an swers of fered in re sponse to the ques tion: What is law? Con ti nen tal normativism of fers a kind of le gal the ory con cep tu ally distinct from both em pir i cal-reductive le gal pos i tiv ism and nat u ral law the ory. Though for Paulson, Hart's the ory does not chal lenge the the sis of exhaustiveness as Kelsen's Pure The ory of Law does. 20 Le gal philo soph i cal con sid er ations can also be found in other dis ci plines like ju ris tic meth od ol ogy, the gen eral theory of State, le gal logic inter alia. It in ves ti gates not only the tra di tional is sues in abstracto such as the con cepts of law, le gal sys tem, norm or va lid ity for ex am ple, but also concrete prob lems as it noted in re vis it ing the mean ing of "juris pru dence".
II. JURISPRUDENCE
As it is well known, the word "ju ris pru dence" has dif ferent mean ings. Har ris calls it a "rag bag" into which all kinds of spec u la tions about law can be found. 21 It is used in the sense of le gal the ory as well as to re fer to judges' ac tiv ity (as in 'case law' as used in France or Mex ico, for in stance). The term "ju ris pru dence" de rives from the Latin "iuris prudentia" that is usu ally un der stood as the prac ti cal and the o ret ical ac tiv ity of a ju rist. Even though it is gen er ally con sidered to re fer to a judge's de ci sions, or mak ing de ci sions with pru dence, in the Brit ish tra di tion it is used to des ignate a gen eral the ory of law al though there was once a time when it was used to re fer to the anal y sis of le gal con cepts. Ju ris pru dence is a branch of phi los o phy, of prac ti cal philos o phy to be more pre cise, but it can be dis tin guished from moral and po lit i cal phi los o phy as well as from so ciolog i cal anal y sis, as a sci en tific pur suit that can be addressed in gen eral or as par tic u lar ju ris pru dence. It is of ten di vided into ar eas such as an a lyt i cal ju ris pru dence, his tor ical ju ris pru dence, so cio log i cal ju ris pru dence and crit i cal jurisprudence (or the o ries of jus tice). Para phras ing Barberis, ju ris pru dence (s.s.) is the dis ci pline in vented by phi los ophers like Hobbes and Bentham, iden ti fied in gen eral with the work of Aus tin and later de vel oped by the Amer i can real ists and es pe cially by Hart's an a lyt i cal ju ris pru dence. It is a strictly le gal and the o ret i cal en ter prise of the cog ni tive anal y sis of fun da men tal le gal con cepts, es pe cially on the legal norm. 22 For Aus tin, gen eral ju ris pru dence, a phi los o phy of pos itive law, is a sci ence that ex plains the prin ci ples, no tions and com mon dis tinc tions in sys tems of law, as a spec u lative line of in ves ti ga tion on pos i tive law and there fore, philo soph i cal knowl edge. 23 Gen eral ju ris pru dence ac cord ing to Har ris "raises ques tions of all kinds about law, which may in volve anal y sis of law and other le gal con cepts". Harris holds that an anal y sis is ju ris pru den tial if a term is inves ti gated to as cer tain a mean ing com mon to dif fer ent le gal sys tems and to sev eral branches of the law. 24 The ob ject of ju ris pru dence is pos i tive law, "an or der by which hu man con duct is reg u lated in a spe cific way. The reg u la tion is accom plished by pro vi sions which set forth how men ought to be have. Such pro vi sions are called norms, and ei ther arises through cus tom, as do the norms of the com mon law, or are en acted by con scious acts of cer tain or gans aim ing to cre ate law, as a leg is la ture act ing in its law-mak ing ca pacity". 25 Gen er ally speak ing, "ju ris pru dence" is the term used to des ig nate le gal the ory in Brit ain, as well as in other common law coun tries. This first and ob vi ous re mark seems irrel e vant; nev er the less, it is of great rel e vance to dis si pate the doubts sur round ing the dis cus sion on the var i ous possi ble an swers to what law is since it points to a rel e vant ground for the dif fer ences en coun tered: the ob ject of cog nition. Com mon law is cre ated by prac tice; there is there fore a con nec tion be tween his tor i cal ju ris pru dence and the justi fi ca tion of law of fered for com mon law rea son ing. It is a dis ci pline that is more grounded on le gal prac tice.
In coun tries in the west ern hemi sphere and the le gal systems that have re ceived their le gal sys tems from the same sources, one can iden tify two main mod els: the civil law and the com mon law sys tems in flu enced by two dif fer ent pe ri ods of Ro man law: ius civile or writ ten law orig i nat ing in the Twelve Ta bles up to the com ple tion of Jus tin ian's codifications and com pi la tions, and case law when iuris prudentia flour ished, re spec tively. The or i gin of com mon law sys tems in feu dal Brit ain is char ac ter ized by lo cal forms of dis pute res o lu tion un til the es tab lish ment of cir cuit courts that pro vided a "com mon law" that built up eq uity as distinct and sup ple men tary sys tem. 26 In civil law coun tries, legal writ ers for mu late gen eral the o ries gen er ally ex pressed in the form of sys tem atic ar gu ments and dis cus sions about broad le gal prin ci ples and pos i tive law. And doc trine is indis pens able to a sys tem atic and an a lyt i cal un der stand ing of the le gal sys tem. Doc trinal writ ings in com mon law coun tries fre quently make ref er ence to de cided cases in order to com pile them and eval u ate their rel e vance. 27 Ju ris pru dence in the United King dom is char ac ter ized by the an a lyt i cal tra di tion that fo cuses on the the o ret i cal approach to law, which is ex cep tion ally crit i cal, 28 and by its in su lar ity. This par tic u lar ity some times makes it nec es sary for it to be "trans lated" so as to pro vide a com mon ground for dis cus sion for le gal the o rists from both tra di tions, Conti nen tal and An glo-Saxon, to com mu ni cate con sid er ing the dif fer ent at ti tudes as to what le gal phi los o phy, ju ris prudence and le gal the ory are. Not with stand ing, ju ris pru dence is a con cep tual in quiry con cerned with of fer ing an ac count of the "na ture of law" that is gen eral in the sense that it is ap pli ca ble to all le gal sys tems, and is mor ally neu tral, in the sense that it does not judge the mo ral ity of law. But juris pru dence as a re flec tive and critic ac tiv ity is evaluative, which does not mean nec es sar ily mor ally evaluative. Judgments are the way to eval u ate the rel e vance or im por tance of the topic dis cussed. Both dis agree ments and agree ments are part of le gal dis course; weigh ing the ar gu ments and coun ter-ar gu ments is key to solv ing a dis pute. Bertrand Rus sell con sid ers "the value of phi los o phy is, in fact, to be sought largely in its very un cer tainty". 29 Ac cord ing to Har ris, in mod ern Eng lish us age "ju ris prudence" stands for "gen eral spec u la tion of all kinds about the law, "le gal the ory" is used to cover in qui ries about the na ture of law and "le gal phi los o phy" re fers to the branch of prac ti cal phi los o phy that in ves ti gates the value im pli ca tions of de scrib ing some thing as le gal. 30 Con ti nen tal le gal phi loso phy, on the con trary, stresses the dif fer ence be tween these con cepts. Ju ris pru dence is the the o ret i cal part of a dis cipline and, ac cord ing to Twinning, its mis sion is the dis sem -118 CARLA HUERTA 27 Ibi dem, p. 428. 28 The term "crit i cal" re fers ei ther to as sess the mer its of the sub ject mat ter or that which in volves the ap pli ca tion of crit i cal le gal the ory. 29 Rus sell, op. cit., note 7, p. 91. 30 Har ris, op. cit., note 21, p. 5.
i na tion of knowl edge and crit i cal un der stand ing of law. As an ac tiv ity of the o riz ing, it in volves pos ing, an swer ing and ar gu ing gen eral ques tions re lat ing to the sub ject-mat ters of law. 31 The con struc tion of con cepts and ex plan a tory the ories is crit i cally ex am ined by ju rists and this kind of sci entific ac tiv ity is the source of many dis agree ments. Chiassoni states that ju ris pru dence dis tin guishes between the non-au thor i ta tive ju ris pru dence gen eral or univer sal ju ris pru dence and lo cal ju ris pru dence in the sense that the lat ter stud ies the spe cific nor ma tive con tent of specific le gal norms in a spe cific coun try. Gen eral ju ris prudence fo cuses on the con cepts of a given le gal sys tem, law and norm, and its pur pose is to crit i cize or mod ify the law. It is a search for the mean ing of le gal con cepts. Gen eral the o ries con sider the law at di verse lev els and in di verse coun tries. Lo cal ju ris pru dence em pha sizes the im por tance of cus toms and tra di tions of par tic u lar cul tures. This kind of de scrip tion is sim i lar to that of le gal dog matic and more re lated to le gal his tory than to le gal the ory, though lo cal juris pru dence ex plains the con cepts com mon to any pos i tive le gal sys tem. 32 Aus tin's work has the char ac ter is tics of a gen eral ju ris pru dence, a sci en tific dis ci pline that has pos itive law as its ob ject in a de scrip tive dis course. Par tic u lar ju ris pru dence, or na tional ju ris pru dence, is a dis ci pline oriented at le gal prac tice in or der to know the law in force in a spe cific po lit i cal com mu nity, of ten called also le gal dogmatic, le gal doc trine or le gal sci ence. 33 le gal con cepts as op posed to gen eral ju ris pru dence un derstood as spec u la tion about law. 34 Ac cord ing to Paulson, one of the rea sons for the dif ferences be tween con ti nen tal and Brit ish ju ris pru dence is that Hans Kelsen de vel oped normativism based on the the o ret ical work of Kant, as op posed to Brit ish normativism that de rived from Hume's em pir i cism, which finds its con tem porary ex pres sion in Hart´s le gal the ory. 35 Each au thor sought to at tain an swers through the anal y sis of pos i tive law. Al though the Pure The ory of Law stands in de pend ently of Aus tin's lec tures on gen eral ju ris pru dence, even Kelsen ad mits that im por tant points of his work con cur with Austin's doc trine. Kelsen states that they dif fer in that he carried out the method of an a lyt i cal ju ris pru dence more consis tently than Aus tin and his fol low ers did. In Kelsen's opin ion, "this is true es pe cially as to the cen tral con cept of ju ris pru dence, the norm. Aus tin does not em ploy this concept, and pays no at ten tion to the dis tinc tion be tween 'is' and 'ought' that is the ba sis of the con cept of the norm". 36 Guastini de clares that "pro po nents of normativism under stand le gal sci ence as a 'nor ma tive' sci ence in two senses: it has norms as its sub ject-mat ter, and its statements are (nec es sar ily) for mu lated in nor ma tive (that is, deontic) lan guage". 37 He be lieves that nor ma tive the ory of le gal sci ence rep re sents an at tempt to de scribe (and to ratio nal ize) the ac tual prac tice and think ing of con tem po rary ju rists. The in ter pre ta tion of le gal ma te rial lies in the descrip tion of norms. 38 Kelsen writes that "ju ris pru dence sees the law as a system of gen eral and in di vid ual norms. in this ju ris pru dence only to the ex tent that they form the con tent of le gal norms. Only norms, pro vi sions as to how in di vid u als should be have, are ob jects of ju ris pru dence, never the ac tual be hav ior of in di vid u als". 39 And the ju rist, as the the o ret i cal ex po nent of the law, pres ents these norms in prop o si tions that have a purely de scrip tive sense, state ments which only de scribe the "ought" of the le gal norm. In his opin ion "ju ris pru dence is to pres ent law as a sys tem of valid norms, the prop o si tions by which it describes its ob ject must be 'ought' prop o si tions, state ments in which an 'ought,' not an 'is,' is ex pressed. But the prop osi tions of ju ris pru dence are not them selves norms". 40 Kelsen's the ory lim its it self to the cog ni tion of pos i tive law, and ex cludes from this cog ni tion the phi los o phy of justice, as well as the so ci ol ogy of law. Its ori en ta tion is much the same as that of an a lyt i cal ju ris pru dence, which found its clas si cal An glo-Amer i can pre sen ta tion in the work of John Aus tin. 41 The dif fer ence be tween Aus tin's an a lyt i cal ju ris pru dence and The Pure The ory of Law is that al though Aus tin does dis tin guish law from moral, he in cludes is sues from moral and po lit i cal phi los o phy in the pro cess of de termin ing the prov ince of ju ris pru dence, and of course did not in tend to es tab lish the pa ram e ters of le gal sci ence. Kelsen sus tains that "…the spe cific sci ence of law, the dis ci pline usu ally called ju ris pru dence, must be dis tin guished from the phi los o phy of jus tice, on the one hand, and from so ci ology, or cog ni tion of so cial re al ity, on the other". 42 Le gal the ory or pos i tive legal phi los o phy in oc ci den tal legal cul ture is the sys tem atic study of pos i tive law; the the oretic method of an a lyt i cal ju ris pru dence de rives its concepts only from an anal y sis of pos i tive law. Its pur pose is to ex plain law to de scribe said ob ject in or der to un der stand it and an a lyze it as a so cial phe nom e non. draw a pre cise line be tween le gal phi los o phy and le gal theory, it is true that that the first is more con tent ori ented and the sec ond dis ci pline, more for mal ori ented. Both share some char ac ter is tics, such as the fact that they are not con cerned with valid law, as in force, nor with le gal facts, but both make sys tematic tran scen den tal con sid er ations on law. 43 These dis ci plines aim at ex plain ing law in gen eral; legal the ory is a sort of phi los o phy of ju rists and its ob ject is an a lyzed by law yers from a le gal per spec tive.
The con cept "le gal the ory" can be used to re fer to two differ ent ac tiv i ties: a gen eral de scrip tion of "law" or a de scription of a par tic u lar le gal sys tem (with spe cific char ac ter istics). Law is a type of so cial in sti tu tion. As a so cial phe nom e non, ev ery le gal sys tem dif fers ac cord ing to the nature of the so ci ety within which it arises. There is there fore in de ter mi nacy rooted in the ob ject of lo cal ju ris pru dence related to the in abil ity to an tic i pate the pat terns of hu man con duct and their re sults. A kind of ju ris pru dence more grounded on em pir i cal facts of par tic u lar le gal sys tems resem bles le gal so ci ol ogy more than ju ris pru dence strict sensu. Lo cal ju ris pru dence is more so cio log i cal or po lit i cal, than le gal. As a dis ci pline, it leads to a cul tural en ter prise more than a sci en tific one be cause this kind of par tic u lar ju ris pru dence is linked to spe cific po lit i cal and so cial consid er ations. It also stresses the di lemma of try ing to the orize law as gen u inely nor ma tive, yet its be ing grounded on so cial fact is acute in the con text of par tic u lar ju ris prudence.
De scrip tive and gen eral le gal the ory is of ten per ceived as op po site to an evaluative and jus ti fi ca tory le gal the ory, espe cially if it in volves a par tic u lar le gal cul ture, but they are ac tu ally two dif fer ent en ter prises, each with its own ends and meth ods. In gen eral, the term "de scrip tive" re fers to a nor ma tively neu tral le gal the ory, but the use of the term "nor ma tive" in le gal phi los o phy is used in dif fer ent ways. Some times, it re fers to its ca pac ity to an swer "ought"-ques -tions (how the law should be, on the un der ly ing val ues, which law is just, etc.) in the sense that ju ris pru dence describes its ob ject -law-in ought-prop o si tions or con sid ering the na ture of its ob ject. Ques tions re gard ing law, therefore, re quire a nor ma tive per spec tive.
Nor ma tive anal y sis has two di men sions. The first one deals with the de sir able con tent of law, which it self al lows two kinds of dis course re lated to the the o ret i cal re la tion between law and moral or the po lit i cal dis course, and the prag matic as pects of the struc ture of the le gal phe nom e non that each ju rist con sid ers ap pro pri ate. 44 Nor ma tive ju rispru dence deals with the va lid ity of the law. Ac cord ing to Kelsen, "in view of the spe cific sense of the prop o si tions in which ju ris pru dence de scribes its ob ject, it can be called a nor ma tive the ory of the law. This is what is meant by a specif i cally 'ju ris tic' view of the law. This sort of ju ris pru dence must be clearly dis tin guished from an other which can be called so cio log i cal". 45 Con ti nen tal ju ris pru dence has attempted to dif fer en ti ate so cio log i cal ju ris pru dence from nor ma tive ju ris pru dence since each deals with com pletely dif fer ent prob lems. And Kelsen clearly states that "le gal the ory an swers the ques tion of what the law is, not what it ought to be. The lat ter ques tion is one of pol i tics, while the pure the ory of law is sci ence". 46 For Kelsen, it is fun da mental to avoid un der all cir cum stances "the con found ing -as fre quent as it is mis lead ing-of cog ni tion di rected to ward a le gal 'ought,' with cog ni tion di rected to ward an ac tual 'is'". 47 The best and fore most ex am ple of le gal the ory is the The Pure The ory of Law, which in Kelsen's words "is a the ory of pos i tive law; a gen eral the ory of law, not a pre sen ta tion or in ter pre ta tion of a spe cial le gal or der". 48 Kelsen pres ents a revised ver sion of le gal pos i tiv ism also known as "norma- tivism" that "from a com par i son of all the phe nom ena which go un der the name of law, it seeks to dis cover the na ture of law it self, to de ter mine its struc ture and its typ ical forms, in de pend ent of the chang ing con tent which it exhib its at dif fer ent times and among dif fer ent peo ples. In this man ner it de rives the fun da men tal prin ci ples by means of which any le gal or der can be com pre hended. As a the ory, its sole pur pose is to know its sub ject". 49 
III. ANALYTICAL JURISPRUDENCE
The de bates among le gal phi los o phers about the cor rect ac count of the na ture of law are part of the sci en tific process, which the in ves ti ga tion of gen eral is sues in epis te mology and, of course, the dis cus sion of the na ture of con ceptual anal y sis. Con cep tual anal y sis is a method used in the ex pla na tion of law; it helps to learn more about the na ture of the con cept of law and de liver fur ther un der stand ing. The anal y sis and ex pla na tion of the con cept guides us in the use of the con cept and there fore in le gal prac tice in terms of the cre ation and the ap pli ca tion of norms.
An im por tant claim of the an a lyt i cal school is that le gal phi los o phy can be dis tin guished from le gal the ory and other dis ci plines rel e vant to the study of le gal phe nom ena such as so ci ol ogy, his tory and moral stud ies of law. Kaufmann points out that no sci en tific phi los o phy can do with out the an a lyt i cal method, to which a syn the sis must nat u rally fol low. 50 In this sense, ju ris pru dence is not pos sible with out an a lyt i cal phi los o phy.
An a lyt i cal ju ris pru dence makes its ap pear ance when the fun da men tal dis cus sion on the sci en tific sta tus of the study of law shifts from axiological to an a lyt i cal ques tions. Contem po rary le gal the ory shows for mal-an a lyt i cal ori en ta tion plac ing em pha sis on le gal logic, the phi los o phy of lan guage and the sci en tific the ory of le gal sci ence. This for mal an alyt i cal ori en ta tion of le gal the ory serves to in ten sify con tact with other dis ci plines in the anal y sis of law (in gen eral and par tic u lar as pects of law). 51 As Troper men tions, in the 1950s, le gal pos i tiv ism regains an im por tant au di ence with the de vel op ment of an alyt i cal phi los o phy in Brit ain and the United States of America, and the term "gen eral the ory of law" be comes pop u lar once more to des ig nate the neu tral de scrip tion and anal y sis of law as a sci en tific method usu ally de fined by its posi tiv ist ori en ta tion. 52 An a lyt i cal le gal the o rists have fo cused their the o ries of law on the ex pla na tion of law within the con text of the mod ern State. In fact, some even make the proper expla na tion of the na ture of State law a cri te rion of ad e quacy for gen eral the o ries of law. It rep re sents a form of le gal theory that is linked to the ory of State to ex plain their mu tual in ter re la tion, both con cep tu ally and func tion ally.
The con cept of an a lyt i cal ju ris pru dence re fers to a the ory that ap plies the philo soph i cal method of lin guis tic anal y sis while still an chored to the le gal cul ture that sus tains a di alog with con ti nen tal le gal the ory. 53 Ac cord ing to the dom inant un der stand ing of an a lyt i cal ju ris pru dence, its task is to of fer a the ory of law which iden ti fies and ex plains the nec es sary (or some times qual i fied as 'es sen tial') fea tures of law. Some ju rists fo cus on the pre cise use of the o ret i cal lan guage or on the vague ness of le gal texts (le gal her meneu tics) as a gen eral the ory of un der stand ing.
Hart uses the philo soph i cal method of lin guis tic anal y sis and dis tin guishes the law that is from the law as it should be, and elab o rates on Bentham's and Aus tin's sep a ra bil ity the ses be tween law and moral. Hart nei ther in ter pre ta tive nor nor ma tive, and that le gal the ory does not need to be evaluative. Thus, in set ting ju ris prudence in a de scrip tive dis course, he spec i fies how ever that "de scrip tion may still be de scrip tion, even when what is described is an eval u a tion". 54 The de scrip tive na ture of an alyt i cal ju ris pru dence is as sured in Kelsen´s normativism since ac cord ing to Paulson, it is char ac ter ized by the coupling of the sep a ra bil ity the sis, which claims that the concept of law can be ex plained in de pend ently of mo ral ity, and the normativity the sis, which states that it can be ex plained in de pend ently of fact. 55 In ad dress ing the na ture of le gal phi los o phy in the Postscript to The Con cept of Law, Hart states that his in ten tion was to pro vide a gen eral and de scrip tive the ory of what law is. The aim was "to give an ex plan a tory and clar i fy ing account of law as a com plex so cial and po lit i cal in sti tu tion with a rule-gov erned (and in this sense 'nor ma tive') aspect". 56 In his work, Hart con ceives le gal phi los o phy as concep tual anal y sis and there fore a de scrip tive one. The purpose of con cep tual anal y sis is to re solve bound ary dis putes about the con cept of law by us ing the philo soph i cal method of con cep tual anal y sis.
Hart starts his ex pla na tion of law in The Con cept of Law by as sert ing the rel e vance of the ques tion about the na ture of law and by ex plain ing the rea sons for its per sis tence. He does not con sider it a de fect of ju ris pru dence and says that even if one can not of fer a def i ni tion of law, its iden ti fi ca tion is in gen eral pos si ble by ju rists and men tions how the answers given have con trib uted to the un der stand ing of law. 57 The prob lem is not the def i ni tion of law; it is not even the ob ject of ju ris pru dence to of fer a def i ni tion; its task is to delimit "the prov ince of ju ris pru dence" by an a lyz ing the struc -126 ture of law, the role of co er cion and the re la tion ship between law and mo ral ity. Hart him self states that the ob ject of this book was to "fur ther the un der stand ing of law, co ercion and mo ral ity as dif fer ent but re lated so cial phe nomena". 58 He con ceives it as an es say in an a lyt i cal ju ris prudence that has been ac knowl edged as a turn ing point in the way ju ris pru dence was un der stood and stud ied es pe cially in the Eng lish-speak ing coun tries.
FINAL REMARKS
Af ter de scrib ing the gen eral per cep tion and evo lu tion of ju ris pru dence and tak ing into ac count the dif fer ent con ceptions of this dis ci pline in the two main west ern tra di tions, the amount of crit i cism made to an a lyt i cal phi los o phy, as well as the re jec tion of de scrip tive anal y sis or ex pla na tion of law, may seem sur pris ing. Descriptivism is part of the research pro gram of ju ris pru dence. Hence, it is im por tant to re mem ber that the de scrip tive pro ject of ju ris pru dence is to iden tify the nec es sary fea tures of the con cept of law. From the stand point of con cep tual dif fer ence or dis agree ment about law, one can not in fer that law has no nec es sary features that can be the ob ject of sci en tific dis cus sion. Epistemological ques tions re gard ing the pur pose of gen eral ju ris pru dence and the pos si bil ity of gen eral ju ris pru dence in the terms of an a lyt i cal ju ris pru dence have also been consid ered.
The rea sons for the per sis tence in the anal y sis of the nature of law lie in nu mer ous fac tors. Law is an a lyzed as an ab stract con cept, a hu man and so cio log i cal prod uct of man kind, per ceived through its man i fes ta tions and known by a re flec tive ac tiv ity. It is a highly com plex so cial phenom e non. This has in turn led some coun tries to adopt a multi-plane con cep tion of le gal the ory that re quires the accep tance of meth od olog i cal plu ral ism due to the com plex ity of law since it con sid ers that it com prises lin guis tic ex pressions, mean ings, val ues, so cial be hav ior and psy cho log i cal phe nom ena. This may not pres ent meth od olog i cal prob lems as long as it al lows for the use of meth ods per tain ing to the var i ous sci en tific dis ci plines in volved.
A cen tral aim of the phi los o phy of law is to of fer ex pla nations of the gen eral con cepts of law and the con cept of law it self. And as Bertrand Rus sell says, the value of phi los ophy "re sides more in ques tions posed, in the rel e vance of their con sid er ation and the per sis tence of the spec u la tive in ter est than in the pos si bil ity of giv ing true an swers". 59 Descriptivism has proven to con trib ute to a better un derstand ing law. An a lyt i cal ju ris pru dence does not in tend to dis cover nec es sary truths on law. Guibourg be lieves the ana lyt i cal tradition is the best way to search for the an swers re quired be cause it is the best way to elab o rate the questions. 60 An a lytic le gal phi los o phy is not gen er al ized and de spite the abun dant lit er a ture, gen er al iza tion does not seem to be treated as the ob ject of the pro gram of an a lytic ju ris prudence. Con cep tual anal y sis is a valid tool. The the o ret i cal con tri bu tions of ju ris pru dence have proved of great prac tical value; there is a nat u ral in ter ac tion be tween the the ory and the prac tice in law.
The fact that le gal phi los o phers have of fered dif fer ent the o ries to ex plain the same ob ject of cog ni tion does not pre clude the rel e vance of their work. Kaufmann holds that only those who un der stand phi los o phy as the re sult of a work of hun dreds of years and are will ing to see the con vergence in the di ver gence may over come philo soph i cal rel a tivism. 61 Con tro ver sial de scrip tions al low dis cus sion, which is at the cen ter of the prog ress of sci ence.
To achieve the goal of this pa per, few au thor i ties were nec es sary: Kelsen and Hart drew the nec es sary lines to reach a better un der stand ing of ju ris pru dence. It seems fitting to con clude with Kelsen that "[a]s it is the task of nat ural sci ence to de scribe its ob ject -re al ity-in one sys tem of nat u ral laws, so it is the task of ju ris pru dence to com prehend all hu man law in one sys tem of norms. This task, was un fore seen by Aus tin's ju ris pru dence, the pure the ory of law, im per fect and in ac cu rate though it may be in de tail, has gone a mea sur able dis tance to ward its ac com plishment". 62 The o riz ing about law as was done be fore John Aus tin, un der stand ing le gal phi los o phy as part of nor mative po lit i cal phi los o phy, is not an al ter na tive to descriptivism. An a lyt i cal ju ris pru dence can not be sub sti tuted for polit i cal the o ries since they are dif fer ent from, though not alter na tive mod els to, de scrip tive le gal the o ries. 
